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THE ZEITGEIST OF SECESSION AMIDST 
THE MARCH TOWARDS UNIFICATION: 
SCOTLAND, CATALONIA, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
THOMAS Y. PATRICK* 
Abstract: Europe is in the midst of a period of unprecedented change. The Eu-
ropean Union is undergoing great unification and centralization of power, and 
some believe that a “European” identity is subsuming the traditional national 
identity of Member States. Contributing factors to this remarkable phenomenon 
include the emergence of viable supranational frameworks, economic recession, 
technological advancement, and mass migration. Some groups, however, have 
been empowered by these circumstances to seek greater sub-state power and to 
solidify regional identities. Scotland and Catalonia in particular present two dis-
tinct independence movements in the midst of continental power centralization. 
Their efforts present novel and serious challenges both to their governing states 
and to the European Union itself. The European Union must aid the resolution 
of these movements or face sacrificing its own legitimacy. Either way, its course 
of action threatens to unleash a chain reaction that may ultimately compromise 
its decision-making capabilities and undermine its very future.  
INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2014, the people of Scotland voted to remain a part 
of the United Kingdom (UK) in a highly anticipated referendum.1 Of the 
84% of the population that participated, 55.3% voted to remain with the 
UK, while 44.7% voted to become an independent country.2 The referen-
dum threatened to end a 307-year long union with England and Wales and 
arrived only seventeen years after an earlier referendum, which granted the 
Scottish government broad new powers and a separate parliament.3 Alt-
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 1 See Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441 [http://perma.cc/9KLU-MUH2]. 
 2 See Scotland Decides: Results, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/events/
scotland-decides/results [http://perma.cc/QG9V-RRG5]. 
 3 See Sarah Pruitt, The History Behind the Scottish Independence Vote, HIST. IN THE HEADLINES 
(Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.history.com/news/the-history-behind-the-scottish-independence-vote 
[http://perma.cc/Y7Z4-XNL7]. 
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hough it offered some initial resistance to the referendum, the British gov-
ernment signed the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012, which transferred to 
Scotland the legal authority to decide on independence.4 
Two months after Scotland’s referendum, the people of Catalonia vot-
ed to make Catalonia independent from Spain in a non-binding referen-
dum.5 Out of Catalonia’s 7.5 million citizens, 2.3 million voted in the refer-
endum, and over 80% of those who participated voted to create an inde-
pendent state.6 As in Scotland, this referendum was not a sudden anomaly, 
but the culmination of a long-standing campaign for autonomy dating from 
the reign of dictator Francisco Franco.7 In 2013, the Catalan Parliament 
passed the Declaracio de Sobirania, or Catalan Sovereignty Declaration, 
which called for a referendum and announced that Catalonia was a sover-
eign state.8 The Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the proceeding, but 
the Catalan regional government subverted the order by declaring the refer-
endum “unofficial” and therefore non-binding.9 
There is currently no clear legal framework for sub-state self-determ-
ination.10 In the absence of definitive law, a crucial indicator of a sub-state’s 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Agreement Between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on 
a Referendum on Independence for Scotland, Gr. Brit.-Scot., Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.gov.scot/
Resource/0040/00404789.pdf [http://perma.cc/CSN2-ZKCF] [hereinafter UK-Scotland Agree-
ment]; Advocate General Says SNP’s Referendum Plans Would Be ‘Contrary to the Rule of Law,’ 
COURIER (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.thecourier.co.uk/news/politics/advocate-general-says snp-s-
referendum-plans-would-be-contrary-to-the-rule-of-law-1.49938 [http://perma.cc/32TG-2UUY]. 
 5 See Catalonia Vote: 80% Back Independence—Officials, BBC (Nov. 10, 2014) http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-29982960 [http://perma.cc/AYY5-9768]. 
 6 See Resultats Participa 2014, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA 9N2014, http://participa
2014.cat/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) [http://perma.cc/GQ2Y-98MK]; Population 1900-2015, 
GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=245&lang=en (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2015) [perma.cc/28Q5-7EMF]. 
 7 See Pruitt, supra note 3; Why a Vote?, PUB. DIPL. COUNCIL OF CATALONIA, http://www.
cataloniavotes.eu/why-a-independence-referendum-incatalonia (last visited Nov. 20, 2015) [http://
perma.cc/LT5X-DRAF]. 
 8 Resolució 5/X del Parlament de Catalunya, per la qual s’aprova la Declaració de Sobirania i 
del dret a decidir del poble de Catalunya [Resolution 5/X of the Parliament of Catalonia, Approving 
the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Right of the People to Decide], Tram. 250-00059/10 i 250-
00060/10, PARLAMENT DE CATALUNYA (2013), http://www.parlament.cat/actualitat/R5_X_
sobirania.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6RJ-M8VD]; see M. Colomer, La Declaració De Sobirania Ja Fa 
Via Al Parlament, ARA.CAT (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ara.cat/politica/declaracio-sobirania-
Parlament-CiU-ERC-ICV_0_851914901.html [http://perma.cc/FRH3-SKTP]. 
 9 See Ashifa Kassam, Catalonia to Hold Unofficial Poll Instead of Independence Referendum, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/14/catalonia-calls-off-
november-independence-referendum [http://perma.cc/VZ9D-P7PQ]; Spain Higher Court Suspends 
Catalonia Vote, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/09/
spain-files-challenge-catalonia-referendum-2014929131040786306.html [http://perma.cc/T3JM-
ZVRT]. 
 10 See Peter Roethke, The Right to Secede Under International Law: The Case of Somaliland, 
20 J. INT’L SERV. 35, 38 (2011). The author states, “International law does not grant sub-state 
entities a general right to secede from their parent states, nor does it prohibit secession.” Id. 
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legitimacy is the attitude of other states or supranational organizations.11 
For European sub-states, the European Union’s (EU) reaction is particularly 
important due to the fact that it is the dominating force in European politics 
and it simultaneously represents the majority of European countries.12 Here, 
the EU stated that the outcome of Scotland’s referendum was good for a 
“united, open[,] and stronger Europe.”13 This statement suggests that the 
EU preferred Scotland as a part of the UK rather than its own country, and it 
cast doubt upon whether the EU would recognize an independent Scot-
land.14 Additionally, the European Commission discouraged Catalan sepa-
ratists by stating that an independent Catalonia would not become part of 
the EU automatically, but would become a “third country” that would have 
to apply for EU membership.15 The EU has not, however, made a definitive 
statement on the legality of the secession referendums.16 Without a clear 
framework on sub-state independence, sub-state secession is treated as an 
internal issue for the state, which grants the governing state full control over 
the resolution of sub-state independence.17 Absent third party intervention, 
the natural tensions between the sub-state and the governing state can lead 
to excessive repression of self-determination movements, social turmoil, 
and violence.18 
This Note explores two current sub-state secession movements in Eu-
rope to demonstrate the need for a coherent EU legal framework on sub-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See SÉVERINE BELLINA ET AL., NOR. AGENCY FOR DEV. COOPERATION, THE LEGITIMACY 
OF THE STATE IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS 15 (2009), http://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/
publications/2009/the-legitimacy-of-the-state-in-fragile-situations/ (select “Download”) [http://
perma.cc/U2Y2-HUA3]; Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power 
and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 372–73, 397 (2005). 
 12 See JEREMY RICHARDSON, EUROPEAN UNION: POWER AND POLICY-MAKING 3–8 (Jeremy 
Richardson ed., 3d ed. 2006); Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sov-
ereignty, and the European Union, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 51, 79–82 (2013). 
 13 Alastair Macdonald & Paul Taylor, Relief at Scotland’s ‘No’ Tinged with Fear of National-
ism, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/uk-scotland-independence-
europe-idUKKBN0HE10M20140919 [http://perma.cc/V7G3-EQCL] (quoting the European Com-
mission). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Brussels Says an Independent Catalonia Would Need to Leave EU, EURACTIV.COM 
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.euractiv.com/video/brussels-says-independent-catalonia-would-need-
leave-eu-307234 [http://perma.cc/J7KH-QZUV]. 
 16 See Florentine Oberman, Should Accession Criteria Be Adapted to Take into Account 
States That May Break Away from Current Members?, EUR. YOUTH PARLIAMENT OF THE NETH. 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://eypuk.co.uk/accession-criteria-adapted-take-account-states-may-break-
away-current-members [http://perma.cc/Q6C5-QDHJ]. As Oberman explains, “the [European] 
Treaties do not feature any provision on the membership of an EU territory after secession.” Id. 
 17 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 73–74. 
 18 See Fernando Betancor, Catalonia and Spain: End Game Scenarios, COMMON SENSE (Apr. 
21, 2014), http://www.fdbetancor.com/2014/04/21/catalonia-and-spain-end-game-scenarios/ [http://
perma.cc/UK7Z-S78C]. 
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state independence and accession to the EU. Part I of this Note provides a 
historical and social background to the ongoing sub-state secession move-
ments in Scotland and Catalonia. It also analyzes the economic, political, 
and legal tensions at work in the two European regions. Part II discusses the 
current international framework for addressing separatists and explores the 
role of the EU in catalyzing sub-state nationalism. Part III assesses the fu-
ture of Scotland and Catalonia as sub-states and advocates for the creation 
of a legitimate framework that will justly address the resolution of separatist 
movements. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The modern conception of self-determination has its origins in the rise 
of nationalist philosophies in the nineteenth century.19 The political mani-
festation of the doctrine, however, is most closely associated with Woodrow 
Wilson and the introduction of his Fourteen Points in 1918, which empha-
sized taking into account “the interests of the populations” of various coun-
tries and proclaiming the “opportunity of autonomous development” for 
European states.20 Despite Wilson’s idealistic vision, “in the era after the 
First World War[,] self-determination, although in vogue as a political pos-
tulate and a rhetorical slogan . . . was not a part of the body of international 
legal norms.”21 It was not until the close of the Second World War that the 
legal concept of self-determination gained traction as a recognized right, 
thanks in part to its prominent identification in foundational United Nations 
(UN) documents.22 
The relatively recent development of legal self-determination notwith-
standing, Europe’s borders have been in a constant state of flux for centu-
ries, largely as a result of a complex amalgamation of revolution, war, and 
secession.23 Even now, there are forty secessionist movements in Europe.24 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See PATRICIA CARLEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SELF-DETERMINATION: SOVEREIGNTY, TER-
RITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 3 (1996), available at http://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/pwks7.pdf [http://perma.cc/NA88-XPBX] (pointing to John Stuart Mill as a 
particularly important contributor to the concept of self-determination). 
 20 Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, Address to a Joint Session of Congress 
on the Conditions of Peace (Jan. 8, 1918) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=65405) [http://perma.cc/L2D3-Y3EK]; see Connolly, supra note 12, at 68–69. 
 21 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 68 (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 317 (1998)). 
 22 See id. at 69. 
 23 See Europe’s Changing Borders, BBC (2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/
europe/02/euro_borders/html/default.stm [http://perma.cc/TT6G-G8KV]; see also The Formation 
of European Nations, WORLDOLOGY (2009), http://www.worldology.com/Europe/Europe_Nations/ 
[http://perma.cc/F234-WWT4]. 
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Yet despite the unusual level of separatist fervor and the successful unilat-
eral secession of Kosovo from Serbia, no concrete legal framework deci-
sively regulates sub-state secession.25 Consequently, the outcome of seces-
sion is determined by the governing state’s attitude towards the secession 
and its ability to prevent sub-state separation, as well as recognition of the 
secession by other states.26 
The renewed secessionist spirit across Europe has been related, in part, 
to the increasingly integrated EU, which is now the supreme force in Euro-
pean politics.27 Like the legal right of self-determination, the EU is a twen-
tieth century development.28 What is now the EU began in 1951 when sev-
eral European nations established the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC).29 The original purpose of the ECSC was to create a close econom-
ic partnership between six war-torn countries in order to prevent another 
European war.30 In the late 1950s, the ECSC became the European Eco-
nomic Community, and it began to expand while further integrating its 
members via open border controls and the creation of a single economic 
market.31 The abrupt end of the Cold War “emboldened [M]ember [S]tates 
to develop a common foreign and security policy” and led to the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, which created the EU.32 At the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the EU continued to integrate and expand, and introduced the Euro as 
the common currency for all Member States.33 Finally, in 2009, the Treaty 
of Lisbon was signed, which empowered the EU as an institution and ex-
panded its policy-making authority.34 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See What’s EFA and History, EUR. FREE ALLIANCE (2013), http://www.e-f-a.org/about-
us/whats-efa-and-history/ [http://perma.cc/N8MB-RJT5]. Several examples include Bloc Nacion-
alista Valencia, Yorkshire First, and Liga Veneta Repubblica. Id. 
 25 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 67–68; Ian Traynor, Is Europe Cracking Up?, GLOBAL: 
THE INT’L BRIEFING (2013), http://www.global-briefing.org/2013/04/is-europe-cracking-up/ 
[http://perma.cc/X2RM-G7SV] [hereinafter Traynor, Is Europe Cracking Up?]. 
 26 See Christopher J. Borgen, Introductory Note to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 47 
INT’L L. MATERIALS 461, 463–64 (2008); Roethke, supra note 10, at 38; George B. Revel, Scot-
land/UK Secession: International Legal Considerations 8–9 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished L.L.M. 
thesis, University of Leicester), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384497 [http://perma.cc/A4QT-XFTQ]. 
 27 See RICHARDSON, supra note 12, at 3–8; Connolly, supra note 12, at 78–79. 
 28 See CARLEY, supra note 19, at 3; The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
3F23-ZAU7]. 
 29 See The History of the European Union, supra note 28. 
 30 See DESMOND DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 5–6 (2d ed. 
2014); The History of the European Union, supra note 28. 
 31 See DINAN, supra note 30, at 6; The History of the European Union, supra note 28. 
 32 See DINAN, supra note 30, at 6–8. 
 33 See id. at 8; The History of the European Union, supra note 28. 
 34 See DINAN, supra note 30, at 9. 
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Several other factors are stimulating the emergence of separatist 
groups, namely economy, identity, and autonomy.35 In particular, the recent 
economic crisis has created widespread dissatisfaction with the current po-
litical establishment.36 Rising wealth and income inequality have led many 
to question free-market doctrines and embrace protectionist policies, while 
poor workers in sub-states perceive that they are unrepresented within the 
larger state.37 These economic forces, as well as ethnic delineations, have 
empowered secession movements, particularly those in Scotland and Cata-
lonia.38 Consequently, an examination of the economics and history of a 
sub-state is crucial to understanding its present and future.39 
A. Scotland: Prospects of Post-Referendum Independence 
The division between England and Scotland has existed since 122 AD, 
when the Roman Emperor Hadrian constructed a wall across northern Eng-
land to repel Scottish barbarians.40 During the subsequent 1500 years, Scot-
land fought a series of wars with England to maintain independence.41 The 
1707 Act of Union permanently united the two countries under one banner, 
although Scotland was allowed to maintain separate ecclesial, legal, and 
educational systems and was given forty-five seats in the House of Com-
mons.42 
Scotland’s unification with England catalyzed an intellectual and eco-
nomic revolution in the country, and the Scottish population nearly tripled 
between 1801 and 1901.43 Simultaneously, the Scots actively participated in 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 55–56. 
 36 See Culture Matters More, ECONOMIST (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21560294 [http://perma.cc/6EWY-U6EP]; Nouriel Roubini, Economic Insecurity and the Rise of 
Nationalism, GUARDIAN (Jun. 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/
2014/jun/02/economic-insecurity-nationalism-on-the-rise-globalisation-nouriel-roubini [http://perma.
cc/RJB9-5333].  
 37 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 55; Roubini, supra note 36. 
 38 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 55–57; Roubini, supra note 36; see also Ross McGuinness, 
Scottish Independence: Why Catalonia, Flanders and Venice Will Be Watching, METRO (Aug. 22, 
2014), http://metro.co.uk/2014/08/22/scottish-independence-why-catalonia-flanders-and-venice-
will-be-watching-4838046/ [http://perma.cc/3SQZ-7QTA]. 
 39 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 56–62; McGuinness, supra note 38. 
 40 See Roland Flamini, Scotland’s Independence Bid: History, Prospects, Challenges, WORLD 
AFF. J. (May/Jun. 2013), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/scotland’s-independence-bid-
history-prospects-challenges [http://perma.cc/ZQ73-46JP]. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See JONATHAN I. ISRAEL, DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHY, REVOLUTION, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1750–1790, at 233–34 (2011); JULIE JEFFERIES, U.K. OFFICE FOR NAT’L 
STATISTICS, FOCUS ON PEOPLE AND MIGRATION: 2005, at 3–4 (2005), http://www.ons.gov.uk/
ons/rel/fertility-analysis/focus-on-people-and-migration/december-2005/index.html [http://perma.
cc/4E2X-F382]. 
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the budding British Empire by serving as soldiers, governors, and mer-
chants, knitting together a shared identity with the British that continued 
well into the twentieth century.44 
The primary engine for the Scottish independence movement, the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), was founded in 1934.45 The SNP was re-
stricted to the fringe of the Scottish political landscape until 1988, when the 
introduction of the poll tax by Margaret Thatcher’s government sparked a 
revival in Scottish self-governance.46 After a 1997 referendum, which 
demonstrated enormous support for a Scottish parliament, the Scotland Act 
of 1998 devolved powers from the UK’s parliament in Westminster to Scot-
land’s own parliament.47 The SNP’s political presence grew after 2000, and 
the party secured Scotland’s first majority government in 2011.48 Immedi-
ately after the elections, the SNP pushed for an independence referendum, 
leading to the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012.49 The Edinburgh Agreement 
gave the Scottish government the legal authority to hold a binding referen-
dum on the issue of secession before December 31, 2014.50 
The drive for Scottish independence arises from economic inequalities 
as well as from political and cultural differences.51 Although Scotland’s per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP) is higher than that of Great Britain, 
and its unemployment rate is lower, the country’s total population makes up 
less than 10% of Great Britain’s population.52 The main economic tensions 
center on the exploitation of North Sea oil reserves and the wage difference 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Chris Gibbs, The New Britons: Scottish Identity in the 18th and 19th Centuries, NAPO-
LEON SERIES (Aug. 2006), http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/society/c_scottishidentity.
html [http://perma.cc/KA84-3CBY]. 
 45 See Gareth Jones, History of Scotland’s Bids for Independence, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-scotland-independence-history-idUSBREA131BT
20140204 [http://perma.cc/6XF3-M72K]. 
 46 See Ewen A. Cameron, Scottish Independence: What History Tells Us About the Outcome of 
the Referendum, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-
independence/11045857/Scottish-independence-what-history-tells-us-about-the-outcome-of-the-
referendum.html [http://perma.cc/VR4T-65LG]; Joshua Keating, Scotland’s Independence Leader on 
How Margaret Thatcher Helped Scottish Nationalism, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 9, 2013), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/09/scotlands-independence-leader-on-how-margaret-thatcher-helped-
scottish-nationalism/ [http://perma.cc/Y6SV-APBC]. 
 47 See Jones, supra note 45. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See UK-Scotland Agreement, supra note 4. 
 51 See Neil Irwin, Why Does Scotland Want Independence? It’s Culture vs. Economics, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/upshot/why-does-
scotland-want-independence-its-culture-vs-economics.html [http://perma.cc/EGG7-G8NG]. 
 52 See Scotland in Numbers, BBC (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-
24866266 [http://perma.cc/RAV9-9YBE]. 
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between England and Scotland.53 Opponents of independence have calcu-
lated that a successful referendum would overexpose Scottish banks and 
create a budget deficit equal to 5% of the Scottish GDP.54 Although the ref-
erendum failed, the UK government promised to grant the Scottish govern-
ment additional power as a concession.55 Furthermore, the 2014 referendum 
does not preclude another vote on secession before the end of the decade, 
which is particularly noteworthy considering the closer-than-expected re-
sults in 2014 and the UK’s own referendum to end EU membership sched-
uled for 2017.56 Other economic factors, such as the price of crude oil and 
the UK tax regime, may also affect the drive for autonomy.57 
B. Catalonia’s Battle for Sovereignty 
Catalonia’s journey towards independence is similar to Scotland’s, alt-
hough with some crucial differences.58 For centuries, Catalonia was part of 
the Crown of Aragon, a sizeable Mediterranean empire.59 In 1453, the mar-
riage of King Ferdinand II to Isabella of Castile created modern-day 
Spain.60 Catalonia retained its autonomy, culture, language, and tax system, 
but its authority gradually decreased over the subsequent two centuries.61 
Catalonia, as a state, was dissolved in 1716 as a result of its loss in the War 
of the Spanish Succession.62 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Jan-Pieter Atsma, Why Vote Yes for Scottish Independence?, INDEP. SCOT. (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.independentscotland.org/content/voting-yes-for-scottish-independence.htm [http://perma.
cc/MG3V-UP9S]. 
 54 See Larry Elliott, Scottish Independence: Still Undecided? Six Key Economic Issues to 
Consider, GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/
2014/sep/17/scottish-independence-six-key-economic-issues [http://perma.cc/A886-Y4RK]. 
 55 See Andrew Osborn & Alistair Smout, Scottish Nationalists Storm Back After Referendum 
Defeat, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/11/07/uk-britain-scotland-
idUKKBN0IR1EQ20141107 [http://perma.cc/9STC-4NAF]. 
 56 See After the No Vote, ECONOMIST (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
blighty/2014/09/scotlands-referendum-1 [http://perma.cc/CA28-ZE34]. 
 57 See Ewing: Oil Price Plunge Has Produced Most Serious Jobs Situation Scotland’s Faced in 
Living Memory, HERALD SCOT. (Jan. 15, 2015) http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/scottish-
politics/ewing-oil-price-plunge-has-produced-most-serious-jobs-situation-scotlands.1421318531 
[http://perma.cc/6S7K-RA7Q]. 
 58 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 55–62; Flamini, supra note 40. 
 59 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 55–56. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. at 56. 
 62 See STANLEY G. PAYNE, A HISTORY OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 351–54 (1973); THE TREA-
TIES OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DICTIONARY 86 
(Linda Frey & Marsha Frey, eds., 1995); Connolly, supra note 12, at 56. 
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Despite its annexation by Spain, Catalonia became a highly industrial-
ized, cultured, and wealthy area by the beginning of the twentieth century.63 
It was independent for a brief time in the 1930s before being subjugated by 
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco.64 Franco’s brutal repression of Catalan 
culture triggered its revival and solidified Catalonia’s separate identity from 
Spain.65 The 1978 Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy 
restored democracy in Spain and provided for significant Catalan autono-
my.66 Catalonia nevertheless moved towards full independence, starting 
with an amended Statute of Autonomy in 2006 that defined Catalonia as a 
nation and gave preference to the Catalan language in political proceed-
ings.67 In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court excised these amendments 
on constitutional grounds.68 This pronouncement only inflamed resentment 
against Spain and triggered separatist protests across the region.69 Catalonia 
also pursued a series of increasingly nationalistic actions by banning the 
Spanish pastime of bullfighting and holding non-binding polls on the topic 
of secession, with the majority of voters supporting secession.70 On Sep-
tember 11, 2012, around 1.5 million people took part in Catalonia’s annual 
rally for independence in Barcelona.71 
Simultaneously, the worldwide recession struck Spain.72 Catalonia’s 
unemployment skyrocketed to 24.45% by March 2013, with youth unem-
ployment reaching 43% that year.73 Catalonia’s languishing economy and 
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its annual tax payment of €17 billion to Spain have contributed to the grow-
ing unrest.74 As the wealthiest region in Spain—with a GDP per capita of 
€27,430 to Spain’s €23,100—Catalans have perceived this payment as a 
burdensome contribution to an inefficient Spanish state.75 Combined with 
the rediscovery of its national identity, the unequal economic pairing of 
Catalonia and Spain is making Catalan independence in the near future a 
serious possibility.76 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Current International and Cosmopolitan Legal Frameworks 
On paper, international law recognizes a people’s right to self-
determination.77 The Charter of the UN proclaims that one of its goals is “[t]o 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.”78 Similarly, the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which functionally serves as the constitution of the EU, states that the “Union 
shall respect the equality of Member States . . . as well as their national iden-
tities . . . inclusive of regional and local self-government.”79 Statements in the 
UN Declaration of Friendly Relations of 1970 and the UN Vienna Declara-
tion of 1993 further enumerate the right of self-determination among all peo-
ples.80 These broad statements, which guarantee self-determination, seeming-
ly suggest that international law is at least neutral towards secession.81 
In order to achieve practical self-determination, an entity must obtain 
recognition as a sovereign state.82 According to Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention, an entity must fulfill four conditions to be recognized as a 
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state.83 Specifically, it must have a permanent population, a defined territo-
ry, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.84 
The fourth requirement, which is more ambiguous than the others, is gener-
ally understood as satisfying an entity’s independence.85 Once these re-
quirements are fulfilled, other states ostensibly have a positive duty to rec-
ognize a state as such.86 Consequently, a sub-state secession movement 
must strive to fulfill as many of the four requirements as possible to obtain 
its goal of being recognized as a legitimate, independent state.87 
Many scholars, however, claim that the Montevideo conditions, alt-
hough necessary, are insufficient for a state to join the international com-
munity because of other states’ often complex webs of political objec-
tives.88 As Ian Brownlie describes: 
In this context of state conduct there is a duty to accept and apply 
certain fundamental rules of international law: there is a legal du-
ty to ‘recognize’ for certain purposes at least, but no duty to make 
an express, public, and political determination of the question or 
to declare readiness to enter into diplomatic relations by means of 
recognition. This latter type of recognition remains political and 
discretionary. Even recognition is not determinant of diplomatic 
relations, and absence of diplomatic relations is not in itself non-
recognition of the state.89 
As a result of these “political and discretionary” aspects of recognition, 
secession is seriously disfavored in practice, despite the superficial recogni-
tion of a right to self-determination in UN documents and the Treaty of Lis-
bon.90 This is because secession constitutes a dual threat to the “twin pillars” 
of the Westphalian nation state: sovereignty and territorial integrity.91 Conse-
quently, anything more than a superficial recognition of self-determination 
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would cause a “radical undermining of [s]tate sovereignty and a dramatic re-
shaping of the present framework of the world community.”92 Hence, seces-
sionist movements illustrate the diametric relationship between the princi-
ples of territorial integrity and self-determination.93 The resulting legal lim-
bo has created an environment where the obvious incentive of existing 
states to maintain their power and territory work to repress sub-state self-
determination.94 As of 2015, only three non-colonial states—Kosovo, Bang-
ladesh, and Eritrea—have successfully unilaterally seceded without the con-
sent of their governing states.95 
B. Self-Determination in Practice: Past Examples 
The EU previously dealt with secession in the early 1990s through the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing sub-state conflicts.96 The 
small, partially recognized sub-state of Kosovo seceded from Serbia in Feb-
ruary 2008 after more than a decade of ethnic violence.97 The EU agreed to 
an ambivalent proposal, which allowed each Member State to decide 
whether to give or withhold recognition to Kosovo.98 Twenty-three of the 
twenty-eight EU Member States subsequently recognized Kosovo.99 The 
European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for full recognition of 
Kosovo in 2010.100 Furthermore, the EU sent the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission (EULEX), which features 3200 police and judicial personnel 
designed to support Kosovo through the administration of EU law and the 
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merging of Kosovar and European policy.101 Both of these moves suggest 
that the European Parliament is sympathetic to recognizing Kosovar inde-
pendence, and the merging of Kosovar and European policy through EU-
LEX illustrates the EU’s demonstrable although subtle willingness to bring 
an independent Kosovo into its sphere of influence.102 
Despite the EU’s apparently encouraging treatment of Kosovo, UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon quickly attempted to relegate its unilateral 
secession to a sui generis situation.103 Some states asserted that Kosovo did 
not set a political precedent at all with regards to secession, while other 
states claimed that it did set a precedent that carried either harmful or bene-
ficial consequences.104 The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion 
on the legality of the matter concluded only that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence was not against international law, and it staunchly refused to 
make any statement regarding the legality of unilateral secession as a 
whole.105 
The treatment of Crimea’s secession from Ukraine has been far less 
promising for separatist movements.106 Although the United States and 
twenty-three EU Member States were among the first to recognize Kosovo, 
both the United States and the EU immediately rejected the Crimean refer-
endum as “illegal,” even though the Crimean parliament’s letter of intent to 
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secede from Ukraine cited the Kosovo Declaration of Independence as a 
political precedent.107 Additionally, the High Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, expressed full sup-
port for the “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of Ukraine.108 The 
negative reactions to Crimea, however, can be distinguished from other se-
cession movements on the grounds that it was greatly influenced by Russia; 
evidence suggests Russian paramilitary troops may have prejudiced the 
Crimean secession vote.109 
Spanish authorities compared the situation in Crimea to Catalonia, not-
ing that both movements were fraudulent and violated state constitutional 
law.110 Catalan officials completely rejected this statement.111 Unlike sepa-
ratists in Crimea, Catalan separatists have worked within Spain’s constitu-
tional framework to achieve their goals, without any trace of outside mili-
tary intervention.112 The Spanish Constitution is silent on the matter of se-
cession, although it establishes the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish Na-
tion.”113 Yet the constitution also proclaims that regions in Spain with 
“common historic, cultural[,] and economic” characteristics, such as Cata-
lonia and the Basque Country, could enjoy some autonomy within Spain.114 
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Prior to 2014, Catalan nationalists had hoped that the ambiguous constitu-
tional language would be sufficient to justify secession.115 In its judgment 
that Catalan secession was unconstitutional, however, the Constitutional 
Court of Spain removed the possibility of a negotiated legal referendum.116 
In response, some commentators believed that Catalonia was following the 
political example of Kosovo.117 This assertion is inconsequential in this 
context, however, because Spain is one of five EU Member States that re-
fuses to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.118 
The Catalan secessionist movement has not been deterred by Spain’s 
consistent rejection and denunciation, and it is possible that Spain’s forceful 
maneuvering will instigate a unilateral declaration of independence by 
Catalonia.119 Spain has already made clear that it would consider such an 
action unconstitutional.120 As a result, the EU would be faced with the diffi-
cult choice of either defending Spain’s territorial sovereignty at the expense 
of undermining Catalonia’s right of self-determination as promised in the 
Treaty of Lisbon, or supporting Catalonia and destabilizing Spain’s territo-
rial integrity as well as other EU Member States with active sub-state seces-
sion movements.121 This quandary demonstrates the legal impasse caused 
by secession movements as a result of the conflict between sub-state self-
determination and state sovereignty.122 Finally, any resulting social upheav-
al and violence may lead to human rights violations, which would add an 
additional layer of complexity.123 
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C. The European Union as a Contra-State Presence 
The recent emergence of supranational organizations like the EU  
threatens to transform assertions of sub-state independence.124 For centu-
ries, international law has been conceived as a diverse community com-
posed of equal, sovereign states.125 Although first realized in Europe, this 
gradually became a global conception as former European colonies, which 
adopted European legal frameworks, declared independence.126 The emer-
gence of the EU and UN formally codified this standard of international law 
in Europe and worldwide, respectively.127 Simultaneously, the convergence 
of authority in a “small central ruling elite” within state government created 
inter-state instability.128 This is because the “highly personalized” nature of 
inter-state affairs, conducted through the actions of a small number of indi-
viduals, created situations where “disagreements on specific issues [led] to 
disproportionate consequences for the respective national communities, or 
the international community at large.”129 
The EU responded to this dissatisfaction by introducing a new para-
digm for its members, which incorporated centralized supranationalism of a 
quasi-federal nature.130 By establishing an association of multiple states 
operating collectively and according to definite norms, the EU placed a 
check on the power of state governments.131 A similar process has occurred 
globally through the creation of an international body of laws in the UN.132 
But the rapid evolution of the EU and its expanding control over borders, 
currency, adjudication, and governance indicate that Europe is moving ex-
peditiously towards supranationalism.133 The result of this metamorphosis is 
a new multi-dimensional hierarchy of law, wherein the state has ceded pow-
ers to supranational organizations.134 This creates, in turn, a two-tiered hier-
archy of power in which the state “no longer monopolizes European-level 
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policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests.”135 Specific exam-
ples of this transition include the Court of Justice of the EU, the introduc-
tion of the Euro, and the Schengen Agreement.136 
Many sub-state entities have responded to the developments in Euro-
pean power structures by “Europeanizing their governing strategies.”137 
Simultaneously, more states have conceded limited authority to sub-state 
entities to regulate certain matters across national boundaries with other 
states or sub-state entities.138 This transformation of power structures could 
empower sub-state entities through the creation of regional-supranational 
alliances, wherein sub-state entities can use EU decisions and influence to 
bargain with state governments or achieve greater independence from 
states.139 Consequently, this collaboration of supranational organizations 
and sub-states results in a dual ceding of decision-making power from states 
to sub-state entities as well as to supranational organizations.140 
One example of this emerging dynamic is the Treaty of Lisbon’s ex-
pansion of regional representation within Member States.141 Specifically, it 
strengthens the EU’s Committee of the Regions by requiring consultation of 
the Committee on matters of local and regional governance in EU Member 
States.142 The shift in the Treaty of Lisbon towards greater “formal regional 
participation in the EU” has reinforced and validated sub-state identities.143 
As a result, sub-state citizens are beginning to perceive themselves as sub-
state members within the larger EU, rather than just as members of a 
state.144 Together, these changes have encouraged sub-state entities to strive 
for greater independence within their respective states.145 The possibility of 
supranationalism encouraging sub-state secession has been termed the “en-
largement from within.”146 
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The question of whether EU membership would be bestowed automat-
ically upon a newly independent sub-state remains unanswered.147 Some 
scholars have asserted that a sub-state’s secession from an EU Member 
State would be treated as a matter of state succession, wherein the “new” 
state would be accepted immediately into the EU.148 The European Com-
mission’s statement regarding Catalonia, however, would seem to indicate 
otherwise.149 
D. Negotiated Secession: The UK and the Quebec Advisory Opinion 
In contrast to Spain’s “empire of law” approach towards Catalonia, 
which has pushed that sub-state closer to an unstable unilateral secession, 
the UK’s approach allowed Scotland to decide its own future via a mutually 
acceptable referendum.150 In doing so, the UK followed an alternative para-
digm to the Kosovo model, one which was established by Canada’s Su-
preme Court ruling on the matter of Quebec’s secession.151 
Quebec, like Catalonia and Scotland, possesses substantial differences 
from the state of which it is a part, namely a distinct language, French, and 
a divergent French-influenced culture and history.152 Due to these differ-
ences, as well as economic disparities, the Quebecois held two referendums 
on independence from Canada in 1980 and 1995.153 The Canadian govern-
ment did not challenge either of these referendums, partially because the 
Canadian Constitution is textually silent on the matter of a province’s seces-
sion.154 Following the second referendum, however, the Governor in Coun-
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cil of Canada submitted three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada: 
(1) whether the government of Quebec can secede under Canadian law; (2) 
whether international law granted Quebec the power to secede; and (3) in 
the case of a conflict on the matter of secession between Canadian and in-
ternational law, which law would take precedence in Canada.155 The court 
subsequently concluded that unilateral secession was not legal under the 
Canadian Constitution.156 Furthermore, the court ruled that international law 
only recognized unilateral secession in the event of peoples governed by 
either a colonial empire or by “alien subjugation, domination[,] or exploita-
tion.”157 It also acknowledged the possibility of self-determination in the 
case where “a people is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination within the state of which it forms a part.”158 The court, how-
ever, specifically stated that secession could be negotiated internally via a 
constitutional amendment or other authoritative legislation.159 
Unlike Spain, the UK does not possess a single, written constitution.160 
Rather, the UK’s entire body of law essentially serves as a constitution and 
is controlled by several general principles, such as parliamentary sovereign-
ty.161 Thus, the ability of Scotland’s legislature to discuss secession is lim-
ited under Schedule 5 Part 1 of the Scotland Act, which vests constitutional 
matters in the UK’s parliament.162 As a result, the power to hold a referen-
dum must be transferred by Parliament to the Scottish parliament via a 
bill.163 
E. The Future of Negotiated and Unilateral Secession in  
Scotland and Catalonia 
As a result of the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision, which left open 
the possibility of negotiated secession, the UK embraced an alternative par-
adigm for sub-state self-determination.164 Although the full impact of the 
referendum vote will gradually unfold over the upcoming months and years, 
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there are already several clear results.165 The Scottish vote energized the 
SNP, with membership tripling in only seven weeks.166 Several months after 
the vote, the SNP won fifty-six of the fifty-nine Scottish seats in the UK 
parliament, up from six seats.167 This development points toward a unified, 
pro-secession presence both in the UK parliament and the Scottish govern-
ment.168 Simultaneously, the Scottish government will receive more powers 
via the Scotland Bill of 2015, including enhanced spending and taxation 
powers.169 Moreover, while further devolution is occurring in Scotland, 
England and Wales are also pushing for their own devolution, effectively 
transforming the UK from a “quasi-federation . . . to a full-fledged de jure 
federation.”170 
Even with increased decision-making power, Scotland may still gain 
its independence in the coming years—the SNP has already stated that an-
other referendum may be needed in the next few years, especially if Britain 
decides to leave the EU in the near future.171 With an overwhelming majori-
ty of Scottish seats secured in Parliament, a strong SNP presence in Scot-
land would make a second referendum likely.172 Furthermore, Scotland’s 
demographics are favorable to a successful referendum in the near future, as 
younger voters generally voted for independence in the referendum, while 
voters over sixty-five overwhelmingly voted against independence.173 Alt-
hough the ultimate fate of Scotland as an independent nation is unclear, the 
UK has chosen a course that allows the Scots a reasonable degree of self-
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determination through negotiated referendums and increased devolution of 
power.174 
The future of Catalonia looks far less stable.175 Shortly after the unof-
ficial secession referendum revealed that a majority of Catalans supported 
independence, Spanish prosecutors filed charges against the Catalan Presi-
dent Artur Mas and two other high-ranking Catalan officials.176 The specific 
charges included civil disobedience, abuse of public funds, embezzlement, 
and obstruction of justice.177 Had he been convicted, Mas would have been 
prohibited from holding any public office and faced up to six years in pris-
on.178 Interestingly, the Spanish prosecutor’s office sent the charges to the 
Catalan Supreme Court and requested that it prosecute Mas.179 The court, 
however, found by a vote of six to three that the accusations against Mas 
and the other ministers were not supported by evidence.180 The Spanish 
government then ordered the court to prosecute Mas, which the Catalan 
court unanimously refused, in defiance of the administration.181  
This episode only deepened the rift between Catalonia and Spain, as 
the decision to prosecute Mas was almost certainly motivated by Mas’s de-
fiant efforts to allow a free referendum on independence.182 Other incidents 
illuminate the growing divide between Catalonia and Spain, including the 
death of a Catalan police officer by a hit and run vehicle driven by a Span-
ish soldier and the termination of a Catalan judge for assisting in the mak-
ing of a model Catalan constitution.183 Catalonia also announced that it will 
open fifty “delegation offices” around the world to represent the “political, 
commercial[,] and cultural interests” of Catalonia.184 
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Spanish politicians claim that secession is a legal impossibility under 
the constitution and that their opposition to an independent Catalonia is 
based solely on that impossibility.185 Yet Article 92 of the Spanish Constitu-
tion states that “political decisions of special importance” may be submitted 
as a consultative referendum, and Article 150 allows the state to transfer or 
delegate legislative power to Catalonia.186 Taken together, these articles 
may support a non-binding or negotiated referendum on secession.187 Fur-
thermore, the constitution has been amended twice since its introduction in 
1978.188 
At any rate, Mas announced in early 2015 that Catalonia would hold 
early elections on September 27.189 The elections were widely viewed as the 
next step in Catalan independence—a clear opportunity for voters to accept 
or reject pro-independence politicians.190 The vote resulted in pro-
independence parties winning almost 50% of the popular vote, as well as 62 
of the 135 seats in the Catalan parliament.191 When combined with the ten 
seats of another separatist party, the pro-independence “Together for Yes” 
coalition now possesses an absolute majority in the parliament.192 Upon 
their close victory, galvanized separatist leaders promised to create an inde-
pendent Catalan state. On November 9, 2015 the Catalan parliament did just 
that, approving a “Declaration of Sovereignty,” which proclaimed “the start 
of the process to create an independent Catalan state in the form of a repub-
lic.”193   This statement amounts to nothing less than a declaration of unilat-
eral secession from Spain.194  
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Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy immediately called the sepa-
ratist designs “nonsense” and promised to fight independence declarations 
in court, continuing the rigid Spanish attitude towards Catalan discontent.195 
The declaration of sovereignty, however, asserts that the Spanish Constitu-
tional Court’s decisions are no longer legally binding upon Catalonia.196  
Rajoy forcefully reiterated that his “government will not allow this to con-
tinue . . . Catalonia will not disconnect itself from anywhere, and there will 
be no fracture.”197 In addition, Artur Mas was once again summoned to 
court to answer for his part in organizing the unofficial referendum in 
2014.198 This time, Mas attended and assumed full responsibility of the 
vote, while over 3000 separatists, including hundreds of regional officials, 
protested outside.199 At this point, the Spanish government has several op-
tions, ranging from the severance of funds to the suspension of the regional 
government.200 It is likely that Spain will gradually increase the pressure 
upon Catalonia to induce the compliance of the regional government.201 The 
Spanish national elections in December 2015 will undoubtedly determine 
the future of Spain’s tone towards the separatists, as each of the four major 
parties vying for power has a different strategy for dealing with the Catalan 
question.202 If the Spanish government’s inflammatory rhetoric and refusal 
to compromise continues, however, violent escalation and widespread up-
heaval is certainly plausible.203  
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III. ANALYSIS 
The insights from Scotland and Catalonia exemplify a growing trend 
towards secession within the EU that has been magnified by economic 
hardship and the EU’s increasing political and economic integration.204 
Ironically, this same integration, combined with other recent forces, has cul-
tivated the rise of Eurosceptic groups that challenge the EU’s legitimacy.205 
As a result of this fragile situation, the designation of a defined framework 
on sub-state secession has become critical.206 If the EU fails to act, unilat-
eral secession, prompted by state politics, may become the norm, leading to 
reduced state legitimacy and further disorder in Europe.207 The EU can pre-
vent this deleterious outcome by using the question of EU citizenship, as 
well as political proclamations, to promote democratic and negotiated se-
cessions.208 By applying its substantial political influence in this way, the 
EU may attempt to foster a precedent of controlled, negotiated secession, 
which will allow for orderly power transitions and increased legitimacy for 
the EU itself.209 
A. The Crisis of Legitimacy 
Scotland and Catalonia together confirm an alarming development: 
Europe is entering an era of rapid change.210 Globalization, inter-cultural 
migration, and advances in communications are among the primary propel-
lants of this transformation.211 Together, these factors are testing the integri-
ty of the EU itself and increasing popular discontent throughout Europe, 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 53–54. 
 205 See id. at 95–96. 
 206 See id. at 53, 54, 78; Borgen, supra note 26, at 461–62; Nikos Chrysoloras, Towards a 
Plausible EU Response to Breakaway Regions, EU OBSERVER (Jan. 8, 2013), https://euobserver.
com/opinion/118655 [http://perma.cc/UD52-J3DR]. 
 207 See Katrin Bennhold, From Kurdistan to Texas, Scots Spur Separatists, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/europe/separatists-around-the-world-draw-
inspiration-from-scotland.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/TPP5-DDQK]; Chrysoloras, supra note 206. 
 208 See Borgen, supra note 26, at 462–63; Connolly, supra note 12, at 101–04; David Haljan, 
Mapping the Theme of Secession, in SECESSION WITHIN THE UNION: INTERSECTION POINTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 10, 16–17 (Catherine Brölmann & Thomas Vandamme eds., 
2014), available at http://acelg.uva.nl/publications/secession.html [http://perma.cc/9TW9-M9HT]. 
 209 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 101–04; Ekaterina Blinova, Scotland Independence Frus-
trates Spain Prior to Catalonia Referendum, SPUTNIK (Sept. 10, 2014), http://sputniknews.com/
world/20140910/192795886/Scotland-Independence-Frustrates-Spain-Prior-to-Catalonia.html [http://
perma.cc/V5ZX-UE3X]. 
 210 See Connolly, supra note 12, at 53–54. 
 211 See PHILLIPE C. SCHMITTER & ALEXANDER H. TRECHSEL, COUNCIL OF EUR., THE FU-
TURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: TRENDS, ANALYSES AND REFORMS 3 (2004), http://www.
nonformality.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/07/2-Greenpaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/QWN4-TXTT]. 
2016] Secession Amidst Unification 219 
while also fostering regional identity and encouraging secessionist ideas.212 
Negative trends in voter turnout, which is expected to be no higher than 
35% for national parliamentary elections within the next five years, illus-
trate the crumbling legitimacy of both EU Member States and the EU it-
self.213 Thus, the EU is facing its own serious identity crisis and needs to 
salvage its legitimacy.214 
The economic downturn of the last five years has simultaneously 
prompted the emergence of two diametrically opposed viewpoints regarding 
the EU and national sovereignty.215 The pro-sovereignty coalition views the 
Eurozone crisis and economic difficulties as “emblematic of fundamental 
flaws in the idea of European integration” and a reason for states to reaffirm 
their individual sovereignty.216 Many proponents of this viewpoint advocate 
the termination of the EU, or at least a sizeable reduction in its scope and 
power.217 Paradoxically, these same factors have inspired a pro-EU position 
that asserts that an economic union is impractical without a full political 
union.218 At present, the Eurosceptic forces are gaining strength due to in-
creasing frustration with perceived European inaction and bureaucracy.219 
B. The Citizenship Question 
Although Scotland and Catalonia demonstrate two opposing forms of 
secession, both threaten to upend the legal status quo.220 Furthermore, both 
the Scottish and Catalan movements perceive the EU as the key to their re-
spective futures due to the instant legitimacy and economic benefit that EU 
membership would bring.221 The crux of this perception lies in the hope that 
each sub-state would retain EU membership through its former governing 
state.222 Despite the preliminary statement by former European Commis-
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sioner José Manuel Barroso that an independent sub-state would not auto-
matically carry EU membership, the question of succession is legally “un-
known territory.”223 
An additional issue is whether the people of Scotland and Catalonia 
would retain their EU citizenship.224 Article 20(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union effectively precludes national measures 
that divest EU citizens of their citizenship.225 Scholars such as Aidan 
O’Neill claim that the nature of EU citizenship rights as espoused in Article 
20(1) and by the Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law would 
lead to the conclusion that both the independent sub-state and the governing 
state should each succeed to the combined state’s existing EU membership, 
so that everyone in those countries retains their citizenship.226 Although in-
ternational organizations generally mandate that new states separately ob-
tain treaty or organizational membership, this interpretation would conform 
with Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties, which implies that a new state’s succession to the treaty 
obligations of its former governing state is automatic.227 Other complica-
tions include the disentanglement of newly independent sub-states like 
Scotland from the fragile Eurozone, the reintroduction of border controls as 
a result of an exit from the Schengen Area, and the loss of the automatic 
right to move freely, work, and study in EU Member States.228 
C. Secession as the Crucible of Continued EU Relevance: The Twin 
Dangers of Unilateral Secession and Lost Legitimacy 
The legal questions of automatic sub-state accession to the EU and the 
right of self-determination present an excellent opportunity for the EU to 
clarify its position on secession.229 Yet the EU’s current approach to sub-
state separatists is contradictory and confusing.230 The EU’s response up 
until now has been to eliminate the circumstances in which the right to self-
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determination is equivalent to the right to secession for sub-state entities; 
this approach has become outdated as the traditional nature of statehood has 
changed.231 This shift in the definition of statehood has also affected sub-
state secession movements, which have simultaneously been increasing in 
strength.232 Furthermore, the recent and profound transfers of sovereignty 
from European states to the EU have weakened national sovereignty.233 
Sub-state entities have consequently “tethered the traditional goal of sover-
eign statehood to the realities of an integrating Europe in which state sover-
eignty is constrained.”234 To further complicate matters, the EU has articu-
lated ideals of self-determination for all peoples that have inspired minority 
citizen groups in Member States.235 Yet the EU’s bureaucratic structure em-
phasizes the primacy of the state by limiting full participation in its institu-
tions to only Member States and not sub-states.236 
In light of this dissonance, the behavior of the EU may encourage sub-
states to seek their independence through secession.237 Similarly, without a 
clear declaration from the EU to guide them, Member States may assert po-
litical and military pressure to suppress sub-state movements and maintain 
territorial integrity.238 One example of this scenario would be Catalonia’s 
attempted seizure of independence through a unilateral declaration of seces-
sion.239 If Catalonia were successful in breaking away from Spain, it would 
provide the simmering Basque independence movement with its own op-
portunity and justification to seize sovereignty and set a political precedent 
for other movements in Europe.240 Spain, fearing this outcome, might do 
everything in its power to repress the Catalan movement.241 The unsettling 
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actions of the Spanish government and the restlessness of the Catalans both 
suggest that this is a plausible scenario.242 
There is a further complication to this kind of scenario.243 Without a 
definite framework governing secession, legal and political dynamics—
including the administrative roles of states and sub-states in the EU and 
events such as the Eurozone crisis—will affect the prospects of Scottish and 
Catalan nationalism as much as any legal principle of international law.244 
The political considerations of various EU Member States would also be 
important in determining the secession question.245 Such was the case in 
Kosovo, where the requisite vote for recognition was “fraught with political 
complications,” as several countries refused to recognize Kosovo’s inde-
pendence because they were afraid of encouraging their own sub-state 
movements.246 The Crimean secession also demonstrated this political in-
terplay, given the prominent role of Russia in accomplishing Crimea’s sepa-
ration from Ukraine.247 Thus, unilateral sub-state secession may be manipu-
lated by other states to accomplish their own political objectives.248 
Despite these unsettling conditions, the EU has the opportunity to as-
sert its influence and to answer the question of sub-state secession.249 A 
clarification on the secession question is important in light of the recent 
empowerment of Eurosceptics by renewed nationalism, cultural fervor, and 
economic instability.250 Otherwise, the return of ethnic nationalism would 
coincide with a breakdown of European solidarity after sixty-five years of 
attempted cooperation.251 Dutch journalist Ian Buruma highlighted the grav-
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ity of this danger, stating, “We know what happened when the twin pulls of 
blood and soil determined European politics before. Without having intend-
ed it, the EU now seems to be encouraging the very forces that postwar Eu-
ropean unity was designed to contain.”252 Consequently, the ultimate treat-
ment and status of Scotland and Catalonia may decide not only the fates of 
the UK and Spain, but possibly the entire EU as well.253 
D. The Democratic Solution and the Opportunity for Action 
Despite these threats, the secession quandary provides the EU with an 
opportunity to prevent a balkanized Europe and to assert its continued dom-
inance in the future of European politics.254 Such a result, however, can oc-
cur only if the EU takes definite steps to elucidate and regulate sub-state 
secession.255 The longstanding fear of encouraging a “domino” effect, as 
demonstrated by the Kosovo incident, has so far inhibited EU action.256 Yet 
a limited framework that allows the EU to oversee negotiated secessions 
could reduce the chances of this scenario occurring.257 Continued consolida-
tion of political power in areas such as foreign policy and the labor market 
would also lower the costs of secession, thus rendering autonomy claims 
more politically feasible.258 
The EU could regulate sub-state secession by encouraging negotiated 
secession movements like the one in Scotland.259 The peaceful and demo-
cratic resolution of the problem in Scotland demonstrated that secessionist 
aspirations did not need to involve violence or coercion, contrary to almost 
every other secession movement.260 This serves as a crucial reminder in 
light of the turbulent situations surrounding Crimea and Kosovo as well as 
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the deteriorating situation in Catalonia.261 If managed appropriately by the 
EU, Scotland’s referendum could instigate a more positive trend across the 
rest of Europe by inspiring sub-state entities to push for negotiated referen-
dums.262 
The EU has the power to encourage a negotiated secession prece-
dent.263 On the one hand, it could attempt to influence secessionist move-
ments to adopt peaceful and democratic mechanisms.264 Additionally, the 
EU could discourage countries like Spain from repressing sub-state move-
ments through the “empire of law” approach, and instead encourage the 
peaceful resolution of self-determination claims.265 On the other hand, be-
cause sub-states critically value EU membership, the EU could use mem-
bership to discourage overzealous secessionist movements and incentivize 
democratic action.266 A strong, defined position by the EU on negotiated 
secession would thus allow smaller populations to exercise greater autono-
my and encourage democratic intercourse.267 By doing so, the EU would 
help to bolster the fledging right of self-determination that is so idealistical-
ly proclaimed in its founding documents, as well as in the UN’s founding 
charter.268 
If Catalonia were to achieve its independence from Spain through a 
negotiated referendum on secession, it would benefit Catalonia in several 
ways.269 As a separate EU Member State, Catalonia would benefit from 
streamlined administrative efficiency, a reduced tax burden, and continued 
access to foreign markets, while maintaining its unique linguistic and cul-
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tural identity.270 Although Spain may have to deal with a “domino effect,” 
wherein the Basque country attempts to follow in Catalonia’s footsteps, the 
current tactic of the Spanish government will eventually lose “the hearts 
and minds of the vast majority of the people” in Catalonia.271 Further re-
pression of both secession movements would only make violent action more 
likely.272 Thus, holding a negotiated referendum may paradoxically help 
Spain retain its integrity, while avoiding future social turmoil and promot-
ing democracy.273 
Similarly, in the event that Scotland uses the UK’s exit from the EU to 
re-attempt secession, it is in the EU’s best interest to let Scotland join the 
organization should the referendum be successful.274 Not only would Scot-
land’s accession be in the interest of the very pro-EU people there, but it 
would also benefit the EU by providing them access to Scotland’s many 
natural resources.275 Scotland’s access to the EU’s single market would pro-
vide Scottish companies with more trading partners and more potential cus-
tomers, while allowing the unimpeded flow of capital, goods, and ser-
vices.276 Edinburgh is Europe’s fourth largest financial center by equity as-
sets and would have the second highest GDP per capita in the EU, behind 
only Luxembourg.277 Furthermore, Scotland’s youth employment is sub-
stantially below the EU average, and Scotland makes up 25% of Europe’s 
offshore wind and tidal resources.278 Finally, Scotland controls a large share 
of the 24 billion barrels of oil in the North Sea.279 Thus, Scotland’s acces-
sion to the EU would benefit both the EU and an independent Scotland.280 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See id. 
 271 James Walsh, Catalan Independence Poll: What Happens Next?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/11/catalan-independence-poll-what-happens-
next [http://perma.cc/23YP-QEH4]; see Desquens, supra note 269, at 94–96; Leopold Traugott, 
Catalonia and Spain—Separation or Divorce? 20–21 (2014) (unpublished manuscript, University 
of Maastricht). 
 272 See Betancor, supra note 18; Filipe dos Santos Henriques, Catalonia: The Next State of 
Europe, THE NEW FEDERALIST (FEB. 22, 2014), http://www.thenewfederalist.eu/catalonia-the-
next-state-of-europe [http://perma.cc/DHA2-TE6P]. 
 273 See Henriques, supra note 272; Traugott, supra note 271, at 19–21. 
 274 See Fletcher, supra note 266. 
 275 See id.; GOV’T OF SCOTLAND, SCOTLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 39–40 (2014), http://
www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00439166.pdf [http://perma.cc/3YAN-Y37U] [hereinafter 
SCOTLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION]. 
 276 See SCOTLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 275, at 53. 
 277 See Tanya Zhekova, Scotland and EU Membership in the Case of Independence, ONE EUROPE 
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://one-europe.info/scotland-and-eu-membership-in-the-case-of-independence 
[http://perma.cc/35FY-FX6Y]. 
 278 See SCOTLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 275, at 24, 39. 
 279 See id. 
280 See Fletcher, supra note 266; SCOTLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 275, at 24, 
39; Zhekova, supra note 277.  
226 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:195 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of unprecedented European integration, the EU faces a 
substantial wave of Euroscepticism and nationalism. This Euroscepticism, 
powered by the economic crisis, has resulted in a loss of faith in the EU’s 
institutions and a dire questioning of its legitimacy. Yet the growing prob-
lem of sub-state secession, as illuminated by Scotland and Catalonia, pre-
sents a valuable opportunity for the EU. By developing a framework that 
allows for negotiated referendums, the EU can assert itself in European pol-
itics and reclaim its legitimacy. A defined framework on secession would 
discourage unregulated unilateral secession that would injure Member State 
integrity, create instability and turmoil, and demonstrate EU impotence. Fi-
nally, action on the question of secession would allow the EU to be true to 
the democratic principles established in its foundational documents. 
With a defined framework on secession, the EU can mediate negotiat-
ed referendums amongst Member States while remaining neutral on seces-
sion referendum outcomes. The EU can also use the question of sub-state 
membership to encourage dialogue between sub-states and Member States 
on the issue of self-determination and to accomplish democratic outcomes. 
With this achieved, the EU can preside over the beginning of a new era for 
the European continent—one that sees the emergence of regional self-
determination as the building block of an integrated, egalitarian union. 
